Universitas Philosophica 28 (57):189-212 (2011)

Authors
Gregor Damschen
University of Oldenburg
Abstract
Is knowledge-how a hidden knowledge-that, and therefore also a relation between an epistemic subject and a proposition? What is the connection between knowledge-how and knowledge-that? I will deal with both questions in the course of my paper. In the first part, I argue that the term ‘knowledge-how’ is an ambiguous term in a semantic pragmatic sense, blending two distinct meanings: ‘knowledge-how’ in the sense of knowledge-that, and ‘knowledge-how’ in the sense of an ability. In the second part of my paper, I construe five alternative ways of correlating knowledge-that and knowledge-how in the sense of an ability. I will argue in favour of one of them. I will show that knowledge-how is not a species of knowledge-that but rather that knowledge-that is a species of knowledge-how. More specifically, dispositional knowledge-how is at the core of propositional knowledge-that and accordingly should be understood to be at the center of epistemology.
Keywords know how  anti-intellectualism  ability
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,436
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Personal Knowledge.Michael Polanyi - 1958 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Knowing How and Pragmatic Intrusion.Alessandro Capone - 2011 - Intercultural Pragmatics 8 (4):543-570.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Dispositional Knowledge-How Versus Propositional Knowledge-That.Gregor Damschen - 2009 - In Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf & Karsten Stueber (eds.), Debating Dispositions. Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter. pp. 278-295.
La estructura del conocimiento práctico.César Lorenzano - 2004 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 29 (2):21-41.
Is Logical Knowledge Dispositional?Julien Murzi & Florian Steinberger - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):165-183.
Success and Knowledge-How.Katherine Hawley - 2003 - American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):19 - 31.
How Knowledge Works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.
Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):19-50.
Knowledge of Meaning.Bernhard Weiss - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):75–92.
Knowledge of Meaning.Bernhard Weiss - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):75 - 94.
A Dispositional Account of Self-Knowledge.Steven Yalowitz - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):249-278.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-12-18

Total views
33 ( #348,080 of 2,520,399 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #405,718 of 2,520,399 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes