The gaze of consciousness

Abstract

According to one influential view, consciousness has an awareness– content structure: any experience consists of the awareness of some content. I focus on one version of this dualism, and argue that it should be rejected. My principal argument is directed at the status of the supposed contents of aware- ness; I argue that neither of the principal options is tenable, albeit for different reasons. Although the doctrine in question may seem to be supported by the find- ings of researchers in meditative traditions, I question whether this evidence sup- ports the dualism that is my target here. To conclude, I introduce an innocuous mode of pure awareness

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2009-01-28

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Barry Francis Dainton
University of Liverpool

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Citations of this work

Pure Awareness Experience.Brentyn J. Ramm - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
I—The Sense of Self.Barry Dainton - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):113-143.
Self-Experience.Brentyn Ramm - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12):142-166.
Look Again: Phenomenology and Mental Imagery. [REVIEW]Evan Thompson - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):137-170.

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