AbstractThose who believe suitably programmed computers could enjoy conscious experience of the sort we enjoy must accept the possibility that their own experience is being generated as part of a computerized simulation. It would be a mistake to dismiss this is just one more radical sceptical possibility: for as Bostrom has recently noted, if advances in computer technology were to continue at close to present rates, there would be a strong probability that we are each living in a computer simulation. The first part of this paper is devoted to broadening the scope of the argument: even if computers cannot sustain consciousness (as many dualists and materialists believe), there may still be a strong likelihood that we are living simulated lives. The implications of this result are the focus of the second part of the paper. The topics discussed include: the Doomsday argument, scepticism, the different modes of virtual life, transcendental idealism, the Problem of Evil, and simulation ethics.
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References found in this work
Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?Nick Bostrom - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):243-255.
A Refutation of the Doomsday Argument.Kevin B. Korb & Jonathan J. Oliver - 1998 - Mind 107 (426):403-410.
Citations of this work
Epistemological Solipsism as a Route to External World Skepticism.Grace Helton - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):229-250.
The Real Advantages of the Simulation Solution to the Problem of Natural Evil.Dustin Crummett - forthcoming - Religious Studies.
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