Logos and Episteme 9 (3):261-284 (2018)

Authors
Hossein Dabbagh
Institute for Cognitive Science Studies
Abstract
In this paper, I argue against the epistemology of some contemporary moral intuitionists who believe that the notion of self-evidence is more important than that of intuition. Quite the contrary, I think the notion of intuition is more basic if intuitions are construed as intellectual seemings. First, I will start with elaborating Robert Audi’s account of self-evidence. Next, I criticise his account on the basis of the idea of “adequate understanding”. I shall then present my alternative account of self-evidence which is based on the seeming account of intuition. Finally, I show how the seeming account of self-evidence can make the moral intuitionist epistemology more tenable.
Keywords Moral Intuition  Seeming  Self-Evidence
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme20189322
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Self-Evidence.Robert Audi - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:205-228.
Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment.Robert Audi - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):15-44.
Introduction.Philip Stratton-Lake - 2002 - In Philip John Stratton-Lake (ed.), On What We Owe to Each Other. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell. pp. 1-17.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Dispositional Account of Colour.Tony Pitson - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):247-266.
Metacognition is Prior.Justin J. Couchman, Mariana V. C. Coutinho, Michael J. Beran & J. David Smith - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):142-142.
Animals and Democratic Theory: Beyond an Anthropocentric Account.Robert Garner - 2017 - Contemporary Political Theory 16 (4):459-477.
Intuition, Self-Evidence, and Understanding.Stratton-Lake Philip - 2016 - In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studes in Meta Ethics. Oxford: OUP. pp. 28-44.
Intuiting Intuition: The Seeming Account of Moral Intuition.Hossein Dabbagh - 2018 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):117-132.
Natural Born Talents Undiscovered.Michael J. A. Howe, Jane W. Davidson & John A. Sloboda - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (3):432-437.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Restoring Ambiguity to Achinstein's Account of Evidence.Steven Gimbel - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):269-285.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-10-08

Total views
266 ( #39,851 of 2,497,768 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #48,214 of 2,497,768 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes