Philosophical Forum 48 (2):175-199 (2017)

Hossein Dabbagh
Institute for Cognitive Science Studies
Sinnott-Armstrong has attacked the epistemology of moral intuitionism on the grounds that it is not justified to have some moral beliefs without needing them to be inferred from other beliefs. He believes that our moral judgments are inferentially justified because the “framing effects” which are mostly discussed in the empirical psychology cast doubt on any non-inferential justification. In this paper, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument is question begging against intuitionists and his description of epistemological intuitionism is a diluted version that most of intuitionists do not believe, therefore he is not attacking the epistemological intuitionism in its strongest form. I then propose my alternative modest account of epistemological intuitionism. I also reconsider the concept of “non-inferentiality”, as one of the key elements of intuitionist epistemology, and propose a modest account of non-inferentiality.
Keywords Epistemological Intuitionism  Non-Inferentiality  Ethics  Justification
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DOI 10.1111/phil.12151
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References found in this work BETA

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‘Moral Particularism: Wrong and Bad’.Brad Hooker - 2000 - In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-22.

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