Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):349-363 (2021)

Taylor W. Cyr
Samford University
Although convinced by Frankfurt-style cases that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise, semicompatibilists have not wanted to accept a parallel claim about moral responsibility for omissions, and so they have accepted asymmetrical requirements on moral responsibility for actions and omissions. In previous work, I have presented a challenge to various attempts at defending this asymmetry. My view is that semicompatibilists should give up these defenses and instead adopt symmetrical requirements on moral responsibility for actions and omissions, and in this paper I highlight three advantages of doing so: first, it avoids a strange implication of the truth of determinism; second, it allows for a principled reply to Philip Swenson’s recent ‘No Principled Difference Argument’; third, it provides a reason to reject a crucial inference rule invoked by Peter van Inwagen’s ‘Direct Argument’ for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048402.2020.1738512
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Responsibility, Control, and Omissions.John Martin Fischer - 1997 - The Journal of Ethics 1 (1):45-64.
Moral Responsibility and Omissions.Jeremy Byrd - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):56–67.
Ability and Responsibility for Omissions.Randolph Clarke - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):195 - 208.
La Responsabilité Pour Ce Qui Est Inévitable.Cyrille Michon - 2018 - Acta Philosophica 27 (1):27-44.
A Riddle Regarding Omissions.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):485 - 502.
The Causal and the Moral.Ana Carolina Sartorio - 2003 - Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Omissions as Possibilities.Sara Bernstein - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):1-23.


Added to PP index

Total views
229 ( #48,062 of 2,498,394 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
66 ( #11,926 of 2,498,394 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes