Testifying Bodies: Testimonial Injustice as Derivatization

Social Epistemology 33 (2):111-123 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Human beings as objects, and we are objects inter alia, offer information, even knowledge. And yet, in a society marked by pervasive identity prejudice, even objects do not offer neutral facts. Here, I argue that the harms imposed on those who suffer testimonial injustices cannot be sufficiently understood through the ethical lens of objectification. Such persons are not simply objectified, not simply treated as mere sources of information rather than as informants. Even as objects (not mere objects), they are often unable to testify on their own behalf or testify to true facts of the matter. Rather than follow Miranda Fricker’s argument that testimonial injustices are acts of objectification, I argue that they are better understood as acts of what Ann Cahill calls derivatization. A re-examination of Fricker’s account of the wrong of testimonial injustice as derivatizing rather than objectifying clarifies the wrong of epistemic injustice, reinforces the mutuality of testimonial exchanges where both the speaker and listener are actively engaged and obligated to participate well to succeed, and opens up a discussion of how even when being treated as a source of information, informants can be mistreated.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,323

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Testimonial Injustice Without Credibility Deficit.Federico Luzzi - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):203-211.
Testimonial Injustice in International Criminal Law.Shannon Fyfe - 2018 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2):155-171.
Pejoratives and Testimonial Injustice.Julija Perhat - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):145-154.
Testimonial Injustice and Mindreading.Krista Hyde - 2016 - Hypatia 31 (4):858-873.
Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust.Gloria Origgi - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (2):221-235.
Argumentative Injustice.Patrick Bondy - 2010 - Informal Logic 30 (3):263-278.
Epistemic Injustice and Religion.Ian James Kidd - 2017 - In Ian James Kidd & José Medina (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. New York: Routledge. pp. 386-396.
Epistemic Injustice and Illness.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):172-190.


Added to PP

54 (#297,460)

6 months
7 (#439,668)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Carolyn Cusick
California State University, Fresno

Citations of this work

Testimonial Injustice and the Nature of Epistemic Injustice (3rd edition).Emily McWilliams - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
Testimonial Injustice and Mutual Recognition.Lindsay Crawford - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Epistemic Injustice and Illness.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):172-190.
Epistemic dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.
Objectification.Martha C. Nussbaum - 1995 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (4):249-291.

View all 10 references / Add more references