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How to Think about the Modularity of Mind Reading
Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):145-160 (2000)
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Citations of this work
The Perception-Cognition Border: A Case for Architectural Division.E. J. Green - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):323-393.
The perception/cognition distinction.Sebastian Watzl, Kristoffer Sundberg & Anders Nes - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):165-195.
Inference or interaction: Social cognition without precursors.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):163 – 174.
Social cognition, language acquisition and the development of the theory of mind.Jay L. Garfield, Candida C. Peterson & Tricia Perry - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (5):494–541.
References found in this work
Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans.Richard W. Byrne & Andrew Whiten (eds.) - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
Theories of theories of mind.G. Segal, P. Carruthers & K. Smith - 1996 - In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Evidence for the innateness of deontic reasoning.Denise Dellarosa Cummins - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (2):160-90.
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