The basis of equality

Philosophy 75 (1):105-125 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper considers on what basis justice may require that people be treated as equals. It begins with an examination of the argument that people are to be treated as equals because they are equals, and suggests reasons for thinking that such an argument is unlikely to succeed. The remainder of the paper considers, and tries to make plausible, the argument that justice requires people be treated as equals because they are individuals. Thus the paper offers some support for the view that the proper foundation of egalitarianism is individualism

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
64 (#228,455)

6 months
4 (#319,344)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Basic Equality.Paul Sagar - 2024 - Princeton University Press.
Why We (Almost Certainly) are Not Moral Equals.Stan Husi - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (4):375-401.
Rescuing Basic Equality.Tom Parr & Adam Slavny - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):837-857.
Why We (Almost Certainly) are Not Moral Equals.Stan Husi - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (4):375-401.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references