The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism

New York: Oxford University Press (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many philosophers hold antirealist views about morality, according to which moral facts or truths do not exist. Does this imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic facts, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. By means of an analogy between moral and epistemic facts, Terence Cuneo presents a compelling defence of robust realism in ethics. In so doing, he engages with a range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral and epistemic open-question arguments.Chris Heathwood - 2009 - Philosophical Books 50 (2):83-98.
The normative web: an argument for moral realism.Terence Cuneo - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Gastronomic Realism - A Cautionary Tale.Don Loeb - 2003 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):30-49.
Moral and theological realism: The explanatory argument.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):311-329.
Outline for an Argument for Moral Realism.Lars Bergström - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 12 (1):215-225.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-20

Downloads
72 (#207,685)

6 months
7 (#176,166)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references