Philosophical Studies 170 (2):335-342 (2014)

Authors
Javier Cumpa
Complutense University of Madrid
Abstract
Since the publication of Universals and Scientific Realism (Armstrong 1978a, b) until Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (Armstrong 2010), via Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Armstrong 1989), a World of States of Affairs (Armstrong 1997), and Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), David Armstrong has developed one of the most influential theories of instantiation in contemporary analytic metaphysics (see, for example, Lewis, in Aust J Phil 61(4), 343–377, 1983; Baxter in Aust J Phil, 79, 449–464, 2001; Forrest, in Aust J Phil, 83, 213–228, 2006). Instantiation has been advocated by Armstrong to give a solution to what he has called the “pressing problem” of “the multiple location of property universals” (Armstrong, in Universals: An opinionated introduction. University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 89–90). Here I argue that Armstrong’s theory of instantiation fails to solve the problem because it involves two kinds of instantiation to account for particulars “having” and “sharing” universals. As a viable alternative to Armstrong’s theory, I propose a theory of instantiation capable of accounting for both phenomena in a univocal way
Keywords Particulars  Universals  States of affairs  Predication  Constituency  Symbolic logic
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0222-7
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References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Science, Perception and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars (ed.) - 1963 - New York: Humanities Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Mereological Nominalism.Nikk Effingham - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):160-185.
A Materialist Criterion of Fundamentality.Javier Cumpa - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (4):319-324.
Three Conceptions of the Logical Form of Exemplification.Valerio Buonomo - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):175-188.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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