Asking Too Much

The Monist 86 (3):402 - 418 (2003)
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Abstract

Most of us think that it can be wrong not to help someone in chronic need — someone whose life you could easily save, say. And many of us find it hard to see how the remoteness of needy people, either physical, social or psychological, should make a difference to this. Maybe it makes a difference to how wrong it is not to help, but it is hard to see how it can make a difference to whether not helping is wrong.

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Garrett Cullity
Australian National University

References found in this work

Equality or Priority?Derek Parfit - 2002 - In Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 81-125.
The Demands of Beneficence.Liam B. Murphy - 1993 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (4):267-292.
The Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms, and Moral Theory.David Brink - 1993 - In R. G. Frey & Christopher Morris (eds.), Value, Welfare, and Morality. Cambridge University Press. pp. 252-289.
Impartiality.John Cottingham - 2005 - In Edward Craig (ed.), The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 438.

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