La creencia en David Hume: reformulada

Logos: Revista de la Facultad de Filosofia y Humanidades 17:107-114 (2010)
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Abstract

This article has as main objective, to present the problems on Hume’s version about believes and its interpretation. This has been of great importance not only on Humean philosophy, but also in the subsequent philosophical thinking due to the fact that his proposal is about the impossibility of reasoning on the matters of facts. Hence, the belief would supply the emptiness of reasoning, and it would fundament and be the motor of our actions in the absence of reasoning. The main objective is to show belief not as a lived idea, as Hume presents it, but as a propositional attitude that moves us towards action. Therefore, belief can be understood as two different but closely related ways: as a propositional fact (we accept what we believe as true) and as a disposition to act

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