Mindreading: Mental State Ascription and Cognitive Architecture

Mind and Language 13 (3):323-340 (2002)
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Abstract

The debate between the theory‐theory and simulation has largely ignored issues of cognitive architecture. In the philosophy of psychology, cognition as symbol manipulation is the orthodoxy. The challenge from connectionism, however, has attracted vigorous and renewed interest. In this paper I adopt connectionism as the antecedent of a conditional: If connectionism is the correct account of cognitive archi‐tecture, then the simulation theory should be preferred over the theory‐theory. I use both developmental evidence and constraints on explanation in psychology to support this claim.

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