Mind and Language 13 (3):323-340 (1998)
AbstractThe debate between the theory-theory and simulation has largely ignored issues of cognitive architecture. In the philosophy of psychology, cognition as symbol manipulation is the orthodoxy. The challenge from connectionism, however, has attracted vigorous and renewed interest. In this paper I adopt connectionism as the antecedent of a conditional: If connectionism is the correct account of cognitive architecture, then the simulation theory should be preferred over the theory-theory. I use both developmental evidence and constraints on explanation in psychology to support this claim.
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Citations of this work
In Defense of Wordless Thoughts About Thoughts.Robert W. Lurz - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (3):270–296.
A Difficulty for Simulation Theory Due to the Close Connection of Pretense and Action in Early Childhood.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2000 - Available on Author's Homepage.
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