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Confirmation as partial entailment: A representation theorem in inductive logic
Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):364-372 (2013)
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Citations of this work
Outline of a Theory of Reasons.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):117-142.
On the determinants of the conjunction fallacy: Probability versus inductive confirmation.Katya Tentori, Vincenzo Crupi & Selena Russo - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):235.
Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (3):371-398.
References found in this work
The plurality of bayesian measures of confirmation and the problem of measure sensitivity.Branden Fitelson - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):378.
The rationality of informal argumentation: A Bayesian approach to reasoning fallacies.Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford - 2007 - Psychological Review 114 (3):704-732.
On bayesian measures of evidential support: Theoretical and empirical issues.Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori & and Michel Gonzalez - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (2):229-252.
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