Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005]

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):201-211 (2008)
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Abstract

Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory. 1. Introduction2. Uncertain Evidence and Bayesian Confirmation3. Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: Test Cases and Basic Principles.

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Vincenzo Crupi
Università degli Studi di Torino

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