Why Fallibilistic Evidence is Insufficient for Propositional Knowledge

Logos and Episteme 13 (2):143-150 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this article, I argue that fallibilistic justification is insufficient for propositional knowledge if veritic luck is involved. I provide a thought experiment to demonstrate that even very strong non-factive evidence is insufficient for knowledge if veritic luck is present. I then distinguish between precise justification, which I suggest is required for knowledge in cases of veritic luck, and loose justification, which is sufficient for practical cases in which beliefs are reasonable to hold even if they fall short of being items of knowledge. In addition, I provide a reason for holding that PJ is required for all items of propositional knowledge, and not only for cases of veritic luck. Lastly, I propose that Gettier-style cases pertain to an ambiguity between PJ and LJ.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

How to think about fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):143-157.
The World Without, the Mind Within. [REVIEW]Brie Gertler - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):235-238.
Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson.Anthony Brueckner - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):436-443.
Knowledge, evidence, and skepticism according to Williamson. [REVIEW]Anthony Brueckner - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):436–443.
Knowledge and Evidence, by Paul K. Moser. [REVIEW]Timm Triplett - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):945-949.
An Argument for the Prima Facie Wrongness of Having Propositional Faith.Rob Lovering - 2019 - Philosophy – Journal of the Higher School of Economics 3 (3):95-128.
Is Evidence Knowledge?Juan Comesaña & Holly Kantin - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):447-454.
Escaping the Propositional Prison.James H. Fetzer - 1997 - The Monist 80 (3):368-388.
Activation Vectors versus Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):419-424.
A proposed definition of propositional knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
On Ryle's theory of propositional knowledge.Israel Scheffler - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (22):725-732.
Propositional Verbs and Knowledge.Peter Unger - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (11):301-312.
Replies to Commentators. [REVIEW]Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):468-491.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-07-16

Downloads
11 (#975,863)

6 months
3 (#445,838)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Elliott R. Crozat
Purdue University Global

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references