The paradox of the knower without epistemic closure

Mind 110 (438):319-333 (2001)
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Abstract

In this essay I present a new version of the Paradox of the Knower and show that this new paradox vitiates a certain argument against epistemic closure. I then prove a theorem that relates the new paradox to epistemological scepticism. I conclude by assessing the use of the Knower in arguments against syntactical treatments of knowledge.

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2009-01-28

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Charles B. Cross
University of Georgia

Citations of this work

Non‐Classical Knowledge.Ethan Jerzak - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):190-220.
The knower paradox in the light of provability interpretations of modal logic.Paul Égré - 2004 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 14 (1):13-48.
The Paradox of the Knower revisited.Walter Dean & Hidenori Kurokawa - 2014 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165 (1):199-224.

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