Some remarks on induction

Synthese 15 (1):379 - 388 (1963)
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Abstract

A feature of induction is the idea that our reasoning about the unknown should take into consideration the known. In this paper a modified version of this truistic principle is supported. It is argued that whether or not the unknown is like the known depends on the nature of the case in question. Discussion of infinite series, Evidence sentences, Total evidence, The raven paradox, Counter-Induction and suspension of knowledge illustrate this thesis

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References found in this work

Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Ithaca,: Cornell University Press.
The Uses of Argument.Stephen Toulmin - 1958 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

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