Abstract

I defend an interpretation of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling according to which that text's discussion of the "teleological suspension of the ethical" is merely one part of a larger project, and cannot be properly understood outside the context of that project. I argue that the question of the rightness of Abraham's action is embedded in a larger question, that of what way of life is exemplified by Abraham; and that this larger question is embedded in yet another, that of whether we are to take Abraham as an exemplar to be admired and emulated; and that this question is embedded in still another, that of what it is to take someone as an exemplar with moral authority. ;I defend this interpretation largely by showing the ways in which the text highlights the relations between its pseudonymous author, Johannes de silentio, and its ostensible subject, Abraham. I attempt to show that the literary structure of the text--in which de silentio explicitly represents, not only Abraham, but himself in the process of struggling to interpret Abraham and come to a decision regarding his authority--reinforces its philosophical concern with the relation between exemplar and observer. I begin with the narrow question of the rightness of Abraham's action, arguing that the text's treatment of that question reveals important asymmetries between the vantage point of the agent, and that of the spectator, in the moral assessment of action. I then turn to the question of the way of life exemplified by Abraham. Focusing on de silentio's interpretation of Abraham, I articulate the conceptions of commitment and trust that he sees as expressed in Abraham's life. Focusing on his attempt to arrive at a decision concerning Abraham's authority, I discuss the problems raised by the text regarding how one comes to a decision concerning a putative moral exemplar, and what the appropriate expression of such a decision is. Throughout, I argue for the relevance of the text's accounts of commitment, trust, the asymmetries between the agent's and the spectator's point of view, and the nature of moral exemplars, to contemporary moral philosophy