Embedded counterfactuals and possible worlds semantics

Philosophical Studies 173 (3):665-673 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Stephen Barker argues that a possible worlds semantics for the counterfactual conditional of the sort proposed by Stalnaker and Lewis cannot accommodate certain examples in which determinism is true and a counterfactual Q > R is false, but where, for some P, the compound counterfactual P > (Q > R) is true. I argue that the completeness theorem for Lewis’s system VC of counterfactual logic shows that Stalnaker–Lewis semantics does accommodate Barker’s example, and I argue that its doing so should be understood as showing that the example is an exception to Lewis’s Time’s Arrow requirements

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,505

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-07-03

Downloads
99 (#213,939)

6 months
9 (#495,347)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Charles B. Cross
University of Georgia

Citations of this work

Every Proposition is a Counterfactual.Charles B. Cross - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (2):117-137.

Add more citations