Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty

The Monist 74 (1):83-106 (1991)
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Abstract

If the theory advanced below is correct, then what is the difference (I know she [Philippa Foot]] will ask) between the moral must/must not and the must/must not of etiquette or the clubhouse? Looking forward to the conclusion I shall reach, let me reply, roughly and readily, that the difference will reside not in anything formal but in the depth, spread, and felt authority of the attachments to which the moral must/must not appeals-and categorically appeals.

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00269662

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10.5840/monist19917413

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David Wiggins
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Citations of this work

Ineffability and nonsense.Peter Sullivan - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):195–223.
Moral Absolutes and Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism.David McPherson - 2020 - In Herbert De Vriese & Michiel Meijer (eds.), The Philosophy of Reenchantment. Routledge.
How Humeans can make normative beliefs motivating.William Ratoff - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1245-1265.
The Hume Literature, 1995.William E. Morris - 1996 - Hume Studies 22 (2):387-400.

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