Abstract

Presentism is the thesis that only present things exist. This view is to be contrasted with eternalism, the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities. It is commonly believed that presentism is subject to a number of devastating objections. The central project of this dissertation is to state and answer five of the most widely discussed of these objections. ;I begin with the complaint that presentism is either trivially true or trivially false. I argue that this objection rests on a subtle de re/de dicto confusion, and that once this confusion is sorted out, it's easily seen that presentism is neither. ;Then I discuss the objection from singular propositions: it seems that there are singular propositions about objects which did exist but do no longer, e.g. Lassie was beloved. But on the standard account, singular propositions about x depend on x for their existence, implying that reality is not exhausted by the present. I reply by arguing that, despite its popularity, the standard account of singular propositions isn't very plausible. ;Next, I develop the objection from trans-temporal relations: yesterday's downpour caused today's flooding. Today's flooding, therefore, bears the is caused by relation to certain events which occurred yesterday. But for a relation to hold between two things, both must exist. So it must not be the case that only present things exist, since yesterday's downpour is no longer present. I reply by pointing out that "yesterday's downpour caused today's flooding" might well express truth even if today's flood bears no relation to yesterday's downpour. ;I then spell out the objection from Special Relativity : Minkowskian SR is inconsistent with presentism; so the much the worse for presentism. I answer that the presentist does better by rejecting Minkowskian SR for an empirically equivalent alternative compatible with presentism than by rejecting her presentism for a Minkowski-friendly eternalism. ;I conclude by answering the "truth supervenes on being" objection. Truths about the past require a ground or truthmaker . But surely the totality of present things doesn't make true all truths about the past. I reply that indeed it does