Contingent facts: comments on Mellor's reply

Analysis 71 (1):69-72 (2011)
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Abstract

As a first comment it should not be taken that we have any argument against the consistency of Mellor’s actualist version of the B-theory. Not only have we no argument; we hold that Mellor’s position is consistent. As far as logic goes we believe that you can translate A into B, and B into A. Mellor takes a quotation from our article as endorsing the policy of doing for time just what you do for modality, and vice versa, and it is true that you can take our sentence that way. It is also true that we are sympathetic to an equal treatment of these two, but it is important to acknowledge that nothing in the logic forces you to do this. In particular, we agree with Mellor that practically no one treats space in an A-theory manner – even though it is logically consistent to do so. Our concern is solely with Mellor’s argument that a certain position in the temporal case is inconsistent where the analogous modal position is not. And our paper is addressed not so much to Mellor’s own position as to an A-theorist who wants to escape the consequences of Mellor’s argument by doing for time what Mellor does for modality. In fact, there is a position against which Mellor’s argument is successful. As far as we can tell the version we shall present is, if not precisely what Mellor has in mind, close to it, or at least sufficiently like it to illustrate his reply in a form in which we are able to comment on it. Mellor’s example is of Jim who …

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Author Profiles

Adriane Rini
Massey University
Max Cresswell
Victoria University of Wellington

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