Journal of Social Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract |
This paper develops and defends an anger-based account of bitterness. In particular, it argues that contrary to what some scholars have maintained, an adequate account of bitterness does not require the concept of hope. That is, bitterness is neither disappointed hope (McFall) nor hopeless anger (Stockdale). Instead, it proposes that bitterness is better understood as unresolved anger, an emotion experienced when a lack of resolution to our violated moral expectations forces us to swallow our anger. Construing the emotion this way not only accurately captures instances of bitterness, but is also more explanatorily adequate than competing accounts.
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Keywords | bitterness hope anger emotions |
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DOI | 10.1111/josp.12455 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Political Structure of Emotion: From Dismissal to Dialogue.Sylvia Burrow - 2000 - Hypatia 20 (4):27-43.
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