Anti‐Essentialism in Practice: Carol Gilligan and Feminist Philosophy

Hypatia 12 (3):142-163 (1997)
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Abstract

Third wave anti-essentialist critique has too often been used to dismiss second wave feminist projects. I examine claims that Carol Gilligan's work is "essentialist," and argue that her recent research requires this criticism be rethought. Anti-essentialist feminist method should consist in attention to the relations of power that construct accounts of gendered identity in the course of different forms of empirical enquiry, not in rejecting any general claim about women or girls

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Cressida J. Heyes
University of Alberta

Citations of this work

Feminist Philosophy of Science: Standpoint Matters.Alison Wylie - 2012 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophy Association 86 (2):47-76.
A Puzzle for Social Essences.Michael J. Raven - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):128-148.
How many women judges are enough on international courts?Andreas Føllesdal - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 52 (4):436-458.
Human categories beyond non-essentialism.Ron Mallon - 2007 - Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (2):146–168.

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