On the metaphysics of species

Philosophy of Science 71 (2):156-173 (2004)
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Abstract

This paper explains the metaphysical implications of the view that species are individuals (SAI). I first clarify SAI in light of the separate distinctions between individuals and classes, particulars and universals, and abstract and concrete things. I then show why the standard arguments given in defense of SAI are not compelling. Nonetheless, the ontological status of species is linked to the traditional "species problem," in that certain species concepts do entail that species are individuals. I develop the idea that species names are rigid designators and show how this provides additional motivation for SAI.

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Judith Crane
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

Citations of this work

Species.Marc Ereshefsky - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Natural kinds and natural kind terms.Kathrin Koslicki - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):789-802.
Sharvy's theory of definite descriptions revisited.Berit Brogaard - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):160–180.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.

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