An Alleged Analogy Between Numbers and Propositions

Analysis 50 (4):224-230 (1990)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A Commonplace of recent philosophy of mind is that intentional states are relations between thinkers and propositions. This thesis-call it the 'Relational Thesis'-does not depend on any specific theory of propositions. One can hold it whether one believes that propositions are Fregean Thoughts, ordered n-tuples of objects and properties or sets of possible worlds. An assumption that all these theories of propositions share is that propositions are abstract objects, without location in space or time...

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1093/analys/50.4.224

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Russell-Myhill paradox.Kevin C. Klement - 2003 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What do propositions measure in folk psychology?Peter Weatherall - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):365-80.
What are numbers?Zvonimir Šikić - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (2):159-171.
An Alleged Disanalogy between Numbers and Propositions.Joseph Melia - 1992 - Analysis 52 (1):46 - 48.
A Counterexample t o All Future Dynamic Systems Theories of Cognition.Eric Dietrich - 2000 - J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 12 (2):377-382.
Propositions, numbers, and the problem of arbitrary identification.Joseph G. Moore - 1999 - Synthese 120 (2):229-263.
A puzzle about truth and singular propositions.Aviv Hoffmann - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):635-651.
Numbers and Propositions: Reply to Melia.Tim Crane - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):253-256.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
525 (#33,555)

6 months
94 (#43,387)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Tim Crane
Central European University

Citations of this work

Intrinsic/extrinsic.I. L. Humberstone - 1996 - Synthese 108 (2):205-267.
Propositions on the cheap.Alex Grzankowski & Ray Buchanan - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3159-3178.
Weaseling and the Content of Science.David Liggins - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):997-1005.
Heavy Duty Platonism.Robert Knowles - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1255-1270.
Negation, expressivism, and intentionality.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):246-267.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The thought: A logical inquiry.Gottlob Frege - 1956 - Mind 65 (259):289-311.
Reality without reference.Donald Davidson - 1977 - Dialectica 31 (1):247--53.
Reality Without Reference.Donald Davidson - 1977 - Dialectica 31 (3-4):247-258.

Add more references