Challenging Partial Intentionalism

Journal of Visual Arts Practice 7 (1):85-94 (2008)
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Abstract

Paisley Livingston claims that an artist’s intentions are successfully realized and hence determinate of the meaning of a work if and only if they are compatible and “mesh” with the linguistic and conventional meanings of the text or artefact taken in its target or intended context. I argue that this specific standard of success is not without its difficulties. First, I show how an artist’s intention can sometimes be constitutive of a work’s meaning even if there is no significant meshing between the artist’s intention and his work. Second, I argue against the claim that the artist’s intentions need to be compatible with the linguistic and conventional meanings of a text. Third, I discuss a case that creates a particular puzzle for Livingston since the intentions of the artist concerned are clearly not successfully realized, though they are compatible and mesh with all the relevant data. I conclude my paper by suggesting a solution to this puzzle.

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Hans Maes
University of Kent

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References found in this work

Truth, language and history.Donald Davidson - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Art and intention: a philosophical study.Paisley Livingston - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Art and Intention.Paisley Nathan Livingston - 2005 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (2):414-415.
Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study.Paisley Nathan Livingston - 2005 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65 (3):299-305.
The Philosophy of Art.Stephen Davies - 2006 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

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