Abstract

John Rawls’s model of a just society has powerful implications for important contemporary issues in education policy and the philosophy of education. Rawls sees modern societies as characterized by deep disagreement about ultimate aims, about religious and moral doctrines that inform citizens about how they live as individuals. This standing pluralism of values gives rise to a fundamental political problem: how might citizens divided over religious and moral issues of the deepest importance nevertheless affirm a stable political order that delivers justice for all? This same disagreement on values and ultimate ends is also what gives rise to many of the most pressing questions in education policy and philosophy. In this chapter, we consider how Rawls’s philosophy can inform debates about questions in education policy and philosophy such as what justifies the public provision of education; what constitutes a fair distribution of educational opportunity; what space a democratic society should make for particularistic, including religious, schooling; and how tensions between educational choice and aspirations for common schooling can be resolved. Specifically, we focus here on three aspects of Rawls’s idea of justice as fairness: fair equality of opportunity, liberal neutrality, and political virtues of citizens.