Metaphysical realism and idealisation

Philosophia 26 (3-4):465-487 (1998)
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Hilary Putnam's famous model-theoretic arguments have the virtue of presenting metaphysical realists with a clear challenge. On pain of embracing either an implausible antifallibilism or the radical indeterminacy of reference, metaphysical realists must appeal to metalinguistic levels of interpretation richer than our own in order to fix meaning. And sense must be made of this appeal. In this paper I begin the task of developing a version of metaphysical realism that takes up this challenge.



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Damian Cox
Bond University

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Goodman and Putnam on the making of worlds.Damian Cox - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (1):33 - 46.

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