Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):495 - 504 (2006)
AbstractRichard Brandt, following Hume, famously argued that suicide could be rational. In this he was going against a common ‘absolutist’ view that suicide is irrational almost by definition. Arguments to the effect that suicide is morally permissible or prohibited tend to follow from one’s position on this first issue of rationality. I want to argue that the concept of rationality is not appropriately ascribed – or withheld – to the victim or the act or the desire to commit the act. To support this, I explore how the concept is ascribed and withheld in ordinary situations, and show that it is essentially future-oriented. Since the suicide victim has no future, it makes no sense to call his act rational or irrational. The more appropriate reaction to a declared desire for suicide, or to the news of a successful suicide, is horror and pity, and these are absent from Brandt’s account, as is a humble acknowledgement of the profound mystery at the heart of any suicide.
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Citations of this work
Kantian Paternalism and Suicide Intervention.Michael Cholbi - 2013 - In Christian Coons Michael Weber (ed.), Paternalism: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press.
Is It Possible to Be Better Off Dead? An Epicurean Analysis of Physician-Assisted Suicide.Andrew Pavelich - 2020 - Conatus 5 (2):115.
Countering the Rational Suicide Story.Maria Howard - 2021 - International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 14 (1):73-102.
References found in this work
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy.Stanley Cavell - 1979 - Oxford University Press.
The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy.S. Cavell - 1979 - Critical Philosophy 1 (1):97.