Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3021-3039 (2017)

Authors
Christopher Cowie
Cambridge University
Abstract
In engaging with the repugnant conclusion many contemporary philosophers, economists and social scientists make claims about what a minimally good life is like. For example, some claim that such a life is quite good by contemporary standards, and use this to defend classical utilitarianism, whereas others claim that it is not, and use this to uphold the challenge that the repugnant conclusion poses to classical utilitarianism. I argue that many of these claims—by both sides—are not well-founded. We have no sufficiently clear sense of what a minimally good life is like. It is a result of this that the repugnant conclusion doesn’t license us in drawing any interesting conclusions.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0844-7
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Weighing Lives.John Broome - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
In Defence of Repugnance.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):899-933.

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