Abstract
According to the dominant account of forgiveness, to forgive is to overcome the reactive attitudes warranted by a wrongdoing. On one version of this ‘reactive attitudes’ account, forgiveness involves cognitive dissociation, while on another it involves affective dissociation. In this paper, I will argue that reflection on cases of repeated offences—where a wrongdoer is forgiven but then keeps repeating an offence—raises two challenges to this account of forgiveness. First, I will argue that, on either way of developing the account, it has the implausible implication that those who forgive must avoid considering the forgiven wrongdoing in their deliberations. Second, I will argue that the reactive attitude account of forgiveness is vulnerable to the objection that it is epistemically vicious. But the reactive attitudes account of forgiveness needn’t be abandoned: I will propose several ways in which the account can be revised or clarified in order to address the problem of repeated offences.