Sélection rationnelle

Philosophiques 35 (2):547-560 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

J’arguerai ici que tout en repoussant d’une main une conception du changement social basé sur la sélection naturelle des pratiques sociales et des individus qui y participent, les théories normatives qui font appel à des modélisations des choix sociaux, qu’ils soient de nature économique, politique ou morale, en entretiennent potentiellement les conséquences. Plus précisément, j’arguerai que les modèles que l’on utilise encore le plus volontiers dans les sciences sociales, c’est-à-dire ceux de la théorie des jeux, de la théorie de la décision ou de la négociation rationnelle, contribuent à répercuter, au plan normatif, les deux aspects — social et individuel — de la sélection naturelle. L’argument s’appuie sur une analyse de la théorie standard de l’utilité et montre que la conception de la rationalité maximisante définie dans ce cadre formel incorpore les exigences de la sélection à celles de la rationalité.I shall argue that though most theoreticians of social change firmly refuse normatively to endorse the natural selection of practices and individuals, they sometimes tacitly validate the consequences of such a conception of social change. More precisely, I shall argue that the formal apparatus still often used in social sciences — such as game theory, bargaining theory or decision theory — contribute to carrying on, at the normative level the social and individual aspects of natural selection. The argument rests on an analysis of what has come to be regarded the standard theory of utility and attempts to show that maximising rationality defined in that framework incorporates the requirement of the selection to those of rationality

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,199

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A more pluralist typology of selection processes.Bence Nanay - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):547-548.
Selection as a cause versus the causes of selection.A. Charles Catania - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):533-533.
The Levels of Selection.Robert N. Brandon - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:315 - 323.
Selection and causation.Mohan Matthen & André Ariew - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (2):201-224.
Artifact, cause and genic selection.Elliott Sober & Richard C. Lewontin - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (2):157-180.
The role of information and replication in selection processes.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):538-538.
Selection type theories.Lindley Darden & Joseph A. Cain - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (1):106-129.
Target selection, attention, and the superior colliculus.Richard J. Krauzlis - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):98-99.
The natures of selection.Tim Lewens - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):313-333.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-01

Downloads
10 (#889,622)

6 months
1 (#448,894)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth Joseph Arrow - 1951 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley: New York.
Welfare inequalities and Rawlsian axiomatics.Amartya Sen - 1976 - Theory and Decision 7 (4):243-262.

View all 7 references / Add more references