Feyerabend's Critique of Foundationalism

Dissertation, University of New South Wales (Australia) (1985)
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Abstract

This thesis argues that: there are no indubitable or highly probable empirical statements that can serve as a foundation for scientific knowledge; the progress of science is not necessarily or generally cumulative; the widespread belief that certain scientific theories are founded in experience had had bad consequences because it has retarded the progress of science and led to the development of totalitarian institutions; hypotheses which are rivals to entrenched scientific theories are helpful and sometimes even necessary for bringing the fundamental presuppositions of those theories into question and for showing up the inadequacies of those theories; the widespread adoption of a scientific methodology which encourages the development of rival hypotheses will help science to progress and lead to the development of institutions and educational practices which encourage greater freedom of thought and action; there are no secure foundations that the dramatist can use to learn truths about human nature or to construct plays, or that the audience can use to decide whether what it sees is a correct representation of human nature and human social relations; plays constructed and presented according to the prescriptions of foundationalist dramatists will give the audience the misleading impressions that well-founded truths are being presented to them and render them incapable of criticising the views presented through those plays; plays constructed and produced according to Brecht's methodological prescriptions are preferable to plays constructed according to the prescription of foundationalist dramatists because they make the audience bring into question fundamental assumptions about the nature of human beings while not rendering them incapable of criticising the views presented by those plays; the fragmentation of knowledge into highly specialised disciplines with their own methodologies and narrow set of problems which has been the consequence of a widespread belief in foundationalism is both unjustified and dangerous; and educational programs in which specialists learn to use other methodologies and to carefully consider the ethical aspects of their work should replace the educational programs that are currently used

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