Carving nature at its joints using a knife called concepts

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):207 - 208 (2010)
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Abstract

That humans can categorize in different ways does not imply that there are qualitatively distinct underlying natural kinds or that the field of concepts splinters. Rather, it implies that the unitary goal of forming concepts is important enough that it receives redundant expression in cognition. Categorization science focuses on commonalities involved in concept learning. Eliminating makes this more difficult

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References found in this work

Doing without concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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