Persons and Bodies

Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):324-340 (1998)
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Defenders of a priori arguments for dualism assume that the Cartesian thesis that possibly, I exist but no bodies exist and the physicalist thesis that I am identical with my body, are logically inconsistent. Trenton Merricks offers an argument for the compatibility of those theses. In this paper I examine several objections to Merricks’ argument. I show that none is ultimately persuasive. Nevertheless I claim that Merricks’ argument should not be accepted. I next propose a view of persons that is an alternative both to person-body identity and Cartesian dualism and offer a view of the afterlife that is compatible both with the alternative conception of persons I present and the Christian doctrine of resurrection



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Kevin Corcoran
Calvin College

Citations of this work

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You Are An Animal.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):205-218.
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Human people or human animals?Eric T. Olson - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (2):159-81.

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