Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations

Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (2):155-172 (2010)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that moral projectivism cannot be coherently fix the content of our moral responses. To this purpose, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism and, in this context, I challenge both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism.

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04954548

DOI

10.1387/theoria.592

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Josep E. Corbi
Universitat de Valencia

Citations of this work

First-Person Authority and Self-Knowledge as an Achievement.Josep E. Corbí - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):325-362.
Moral emotions, principles, and the locus of moral perception.Joseph E. Corbi - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2):61-80.
First‐Person Authority and Self‐Knowledge as an Achievement.Josep E. Corbí - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):325-362.
The Mud of Experience and Kinds of Awareness.Josep E. Corbí - 2007 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):5-15.
The Insight of Empiricism: In Defence of a Hypothetical but Propositional Given.Josep E. Corbí - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):289-298.

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References found in this work

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The sources of normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.

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