Experimental Ethics - A Critical Analysis
In
Morality in Times of naturalising the mind. deGruyter. pp. 145-162 (
2014)
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Abstract
According to experimental philosophers, experiments conducted within the psychological sciences and the neurosciences can show that moral intuitions are incapable of thorough justification. Thus, as a substitute for reliable philosophical justifications, psychological or neuropsychological explanations should be taken into consideration to provide guidance about our conduct. - In my essay I shall argue against both claims. First, I will defend the justificatory capacity of moral philosophy and maintain that empirical evidence cannot undermine moral judgements. Secondly, I will point to some methodological difficulties in psychological and neuroscientific explanations of moral judgments. Finally I will show that Greene's (2008) argument from morally irrelevant factors fails to prove that moral implications can be drawn from scientific theories about moral psychology.