Abstract

According to Merleau-Ponty, psychologism, sociologism, and historicism, all of which describe human consciousness as “conditioned”, would be incompatible with any claim to knowledge. However, the reason why knowledge would require a postulate of the autonomy of consciousness remains little explored in the specialized literature. Therefore, in our work we try to separate different aspects of the skeptical problem analyzed by Merleau-Ponty and show that the conditioning of thought is associated, successively, with the possible opaque character of the foundations of our own grasp of the position; the possible ephemeral character of the objects of knowledge; and, finally, of the possible relativity of knowledge to our historical period. In other words, we see that Merleau-Ponty’s argumentation, far from being monolithic, calls for three different solutions concerning the “crisis” of knowledge and that, in turn, the very problem that these are trying to solve is described by the phenomenologist in three different ways. We will also see that Merleau-Ponty’s own position during this period can be described as an internalist and universalist position.