Hume's Moral Realism

Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin (1998)
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Abstract

David Hume has been variously interpreted as an emotivist , a subjectivist , a projectivist , a realist , all of the above , and none of the above . In my dissertation I attempt to clear up this confusion. I argue that Hume is a moral realist who embraces a secondary-quality model for moral value. As such, he believes that there are true moral propositions, that their truth is to some extent independent of human beliefs, attitudes, and desires, and that, nevertheless, moral qualities cannot be understood apart from their effect on human perceivers. I defend this account against both exegetical objections by Hume scholars and substantive objections by contemporary moral realists, quasi-realists, and anti-realists

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John Corvino
Wayne State University

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