Foundational versus Nonfoundational Theories of Empirical Justification

American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (4):287 - 297 (1977)
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Epistemic value.William G. Lycan - 1985 - Synthese 64 (2):137 - 164.
Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217.
The two faces of Quine's naturalism.Susan Haack - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):335 - 356.
The trouble with infinitism.Andrew D. Cling - 2004 - Synthese 138 (1):101 - 123.

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