Asunto de abstracción o de carácter: Husserl y Brentano en torno a la Wahrnehmungsvorstellung y la Phantasievorstellung

The distinction between perception and fantasy is not a cliché among others. Tracing the path to its correct elaboration even allows us to think this distinction as the engine of the early Husserlian phenomenology. For this reason, this brief article aims to contrast Brentano and Husserl's vision of this subject. For the former, fantasy is an improper representation [Vorstellung] with an intuitive nucleus; for the latter, it has a properly intuitive character. In this transit, it will be shown that this opposite view is mainly due to Husserl's general critique of Brentano's idea, according to which intentionality has essentially two objects and this critique is in turn rooted in Husserl's well-known theory of Auffassung. Thus, we will finally show that the dispute of both authors regarding fantasy and perception must be understood as one of the consequences of the theory of apprehension, elaborated by Husserl in the VI Logical Investigation.