Perl and Schroeder’s presuppositional error theory

Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1473-1493 (2019)
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Abstract

Ronald Dworkin charges that the error theory is a position in first-order moral theory that should be judged by the standards that are appropriately used in evaluating first-order theories. Perl and Schroeder contend that a “presuppositional error theory” can avoid Dworkin’s charge. On the presuppositional view, moral sentences, such as, “It is wrong to torture babies,” have a false presupposition. Perhaps, for example, they presuppose that there are objectively prescriptive moral standards. This proposal can be understood in different ways, depending on one’s view about presupposition. In Perl and Schroeder’s view, the “at issue” proposition expressed by an assertion of can be cleanly distinguished from the presupposed proposition, and the overall content of an assertion of is the set of these two propositions. On an “entanglement view”, the presupposed proposition is entangled with the proposition expressed by an assertion of in such a way that it is not possible to distinguish cleanly between the “at issue” content and the presupposed content. Perl and Schroeder are correct that, on their view, the presuppositional error theory can avoid Dworkin’s charge. On the entanglement view, however, it cannot avoid Dworkin’s charge. Unfortunately, however, I argue, Perl and Schroeder’s view is implausible for independent reasons. Further, I contend, Perl and Schroeder do not have a solid argument against the entanglement view. They also lack a solid argument in favor of the key, controversial thesis that moral sentences presuppose that there are objectively prescriptive moral standards.

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Author's Profile

David Copp
University of California, Davis

References found in this work

Pragmatic Presuppositions.Robert Stalnaker - 1974 - In Context and Content. Oxford University Press. pp. 47--62.
Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it.Ronald Dworkin - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (2):87-139.
Attributing error without taking a stand.Caleb Perl & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1453-1471.
Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness.David O. Brink - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):111 – 125.
Presupposition.David I. Beaver - 1997 - In Johan van Bentham & Alice ter Meulen (eds.), Handbook of Logic and Language. MIT Press.

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