Tracking, reliabilism, and possible worlds

Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 8 (1) (2004)
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Abstract

Robert Nozick’s tracking account of knowledge is defended against Colin McGinn’s criticisms by drawing on David Deutsch’s ’multiverse’ conception of possible worlds. Knowledge on the tracking account requires a ’method’ or ’way’ of believing. Exploiting this feature undercuts the apparent force of McGinn’s counter-examples.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.
On the Plurality of Worlds.Allen Stairs - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):333-352.

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