Abstract
TERENCE Irwin's Socrates will be a familiar figure to many readers of his new translation and philosophical commentary on the Gorgias. In his widely read Plato's Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues, Irwin presented a comprehensive interpretation of the moral theory underlying Socrates' examination of his various interlocutors in Plato's early dialogues. Central to this interpretation is Irwin's conception of what Socrates is committed to by the reliance on the analogy between virtues and crafts that is so prominent a feature of his argumentation. Irwin thinks Socrates' craft analogy commits him to holding that the virtues have a product that is totally distinct from them, and by reference to which they do their work of selecting particular actions and general plans for living. The result is that virtuous ways of living cannot be any part of the goal of life on Socrates' theory, but can only be rightly chosen as the best way of securing some good or goods whose nature and existence are totally independent of them. So Irwin's Socrates not only holds, as other interpreters have supposed, that all desires are for the agent's overall good and that virtues like courage and justice are nothing but cognitive states, with nothing merely affective about them. He is also committed to a solely instrumental relation between each of these virtues and the agent's overall good. Hence for Irwin there is no difficulty in Socrates' apparent championing of the hedonism of ordinary people in the Protagoras. If hedonism is true then this supposed commitment of Socrates' will find a ready vindication: the virtues are just the most effective instrumental means to happiness construed as the maximum excess of pleasure over pain over one's whole lifetime.