Still counterintuitive: A reply to Kremer

Analysis 63 (3):257–261 (2003)
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Abstract

In (2002) I argued that Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth (1993) has counterintuitive consequences. In particular, the pair of sentences: (S1) At least one of S1 and S2 is false. (S2) Both of S1 and S2 are false.1 is pathological on the Revision account. There is one, and only one, assignment of truth values to {(S1), (S2)} that make the corresponding Tarski..

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Roy T. Cook
University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3):135-158.
How to find an attractive solution to the liar paradox.Mark Pinder - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1661-1680.

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