Wittgenstein, Non-Factualism, and Deflationism

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):559-585 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Amongst those views sometimes attributed to the later Wittgenstein are included both a deflationary theory of truth, as well as a non-factualism about certain regions of discourse. Evidence in favor of the former attribution, it is thought, can be found in Wittgenstein’s apparent affirmation of the basic definitional equivalence of ‘p’ is true and p in §136 of his Philosophical Investigations. Evidence in favor of the latter attribution, it might then be presumed, can be found in the context of the so-called ‘private language argument’, wherein Wittgenstein provides an expressivist treatment of first-person present tense sensation utterances. In this paper, by contrast, I will argue that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is best understood as endorsing neither a non-factualism about sensation utterances, nor a deflationism about truth. Wittgenstein should instead be understood as offering a ‘mixed’ view of sensation utterances according to which some while not others are apt for expressivist treatment. Moreover, he should be thought of as identifying truth-conditions with semantic ‘correctness-conditions’, and thus truth with semantic ‘assertibility’.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism.Massimiliano Vignolo - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):84-103.
Semantic Realism and Kripke’s Wittgenstein.George M. Wilson - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):99-122.
Levity.Leon Horsten - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):555-581.
On the determination argument against deflationism.Douglas Patterson - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):243–250.
Reliabilism and deflationism.James R. Beebe - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):495 – 510.
‘Two Dogmas’ -- All Bark and No Bite?: Carnap and Quine on Analyticity.Paul A. Gregory - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633–648.
‘Two Dogmas’ -- All Bark and No Bite?: Carnap and Quine on Analyticity.Paul A. Gregory - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633 - 648.
Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism.Daniel Whiting - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):607-624.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-10-19

Downloads
46 (#304,991)

6 months
4 (#319,344)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Wittgenstein, deflationism and moral entities.Jordi Fairhurst - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11023-11050.
Truth in the Investigations.Nicoletta Bartunek - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4091-4111.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Language, truth and logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London,: V. Gollancz.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

View all 58 references / Add more references